UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) SCREENING AND EVALUATION EDT-622983 INSTRUCTIONSRespond t o each question and provide j u s t i f l c a t i o n for each response Constitute a satisfactory j u s t i f i c a t i o n or basis
t h a t an independent reviewer could reach the same conclusion based on the information provided [DOE 5480.21 .
10.e.11
A restatement o f the question does n o t An adequate JuStiflcatiOn provides sufficient explanation such PNL-SAR-327. 327 Building Safety Analysis Report (SARI. Sectlon 6 2.4 C r i t i c a l i t y addresses the potential for an accidental c r i t i c a l i t y and the controls t h a t e x i s t i n the 327 f a c i l i t y t o minimize that p o t e n t~a l t o the p o i n t t h a t i t i s considered v i r t u a l l y incredible [Section 6.4 
. Risk Assessment potential
The proposed change i n the subject CSER does not impact t h a t It also specifies t h a t fissionable material batches based solely on mass and number or number l i m i t s 
INTRODUCTION
The 327 Building is used to perform post irradiation testing of fissionable materials in remotely manipulated hot cells. Historically, scrap pieces of fuel cladding, cleanup materials, and other items have been placed into one-gallon paint cans for storage and ultimately disposal. These cans of materials had been assumed to contain no (or essentially no) fissionable materials, and therefore were not specifically controlled for material accountability.
Recently, eight (8) cans with high radiation levels were selected be assayed for content. These cans contained from 0 to 2.5 grams of fissionable material, with an average of 1 gram per can, Since several of the hot cells contained a significant quantity of the cans, concerns were raised as to whether a CPS nonconformance had occurred, and should the cans have some limits for operation placed on them. This analysis is a response to the concerns raised, and gives guidance for incorporating operating limits for the one-gallon waste cans.
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM AND FACILITY
The 327 building canyon contains many separate hot cells. Each of the hot cells has a mass limit on scrap and a number limit on fuel pins. The hot cells of concern are cells A through I plus the Special Environment Radiometallurgy Facility (SERF) operating area and storage cell. A description of each cell from the 327 building SAR (PNL-SAR-327,1995) is given in See PNL-SAR-327 for additional information.
Currently there are limits for batches of moderated fissionable materials, FBR fuel pins, and N Reactor fuel. New limits are necessary for the one-gallon cans.
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION
There are no unique requirements applicable to this evaluation.
METHODOLOGY
The method used for this analysis was to set the limits based on 45% of the maximum subcritical concentrations or densities for aqueous solutions reflected by an effectively infinite thickness of water for 239Pu, 235U, and 233U and convert this data to mass limits for each can, and for number of cans in a batch. This data came from the single parameter data found in Pruvost (1 996), Nuclear Criticality Safety Guide.
The limits are based on homogeneous solutions of the specified isotopes. For the operation described here, the material will be in finite round cans. The limits therefore have additional conservatism due to the increased effective area from the space around the cans.
This methodology is the same as used for the current limits. This also allows operations to continue utilizing the same methods for calculating how much material is allowed in a cell based on the fraction of the limit each different material present.
DISCUSSION OF CONTINGENCIES
Since it is assumed that the system is optimally moderated, and fully reflected, there are no contingencies associated with those parameters. The parameters of concern are can mass, hot cell areal density and can stacking limit. Each of these parameters will be discussed below.
Since the limiting per can mass is based upon 45% of the maximum subcritical concentration limit, if all cans were double batched, the system would still be well subcritical. This is highly unlikely since a check of eight (8) cans showed that the average can contains less than a gram of fissionable material.
The number of cans allowed in a cell is based upon 45% of the maximum subcritical areal density, with the cans uniformly spread throughout the cell and all cans filled to the maximum allowable mass. The concern here is the unlikely circumstance that the cans are all somehow crushed. If double the allowed number of cans were in a cell, and the cell were collapsed the system would still be subcritical.
The can stacking limit is based on the maximum subcritical areal density, and the dimensions of the cans. In the unlikely event that a cell collapses, thereby crushing the cans, if all the floor area had cans stacked to the limit, exceeding the number of cans limit for the cell, the system would still be subcritical. If one or two stacks of cans in a cell were to exceed the stack height limit, without exceeding the number of cans limit for the cell, it may exceed the areal density subcritical limit in a localized region. However, the system would still be subcritical, since the area involved would be to small to act as an infinite slab, the steel of the cans would lower the reactivity, and the system would still not likely be optimally moderated. Therefore, the double contingency principle would not be violated, since the cans would have to be collapsed and fissile material would have to be added to approach a critical condition. Also, the conservatisms of fissile mass, moderation, geometry and reflection make the necessary amount of added fissile material more than that required for a minimum critical condition.
The assumption of optimal moderation, and full reflection also allows the continued use of fire fighting category A for the facility.
EVALUATION AND RESULTS
The maximum single parameter solution subcritical limits for 239Pu, 235U, and 233U from Pruvost, (1996) are given in Table 2 . Because these are subcritical limits, they are less than the minimum critical values for the more conservative model of fissile isotope atom in water given in Carter, (1967) . Table 2 . Maximum Single Parameter Subcritical Limits (Pruvost, 1996) . By utilizing the safety factor of 45% of the maximum subcritical concentration and converting from liters to gallons, the maximum permitted mass in a one-gallon container was calculated for each of the defined isotopes. The results of these calculations are given in Table 3 . These limits are considered upper limits for fissile material in the one-gallon cans for operations because these cans were to be deposited in alpha caissons that had a 15 gram per can limit (Friar, 1989.) , and were filled under a procedure such as 3M-SOP-PTL-094 (1995) which called for a 12 gram limit per can. Table 3 . Operating Limits for One-gallon Cans in the Hot Cells and SERF
The total number of cans of material allowed in each hot cell was then calculated. The same safety factor of 45% of the maximum subcritical areal density was used. The smallest area of each of the hot cells was calculated from Table 1 , this was then multiplied by 45% of the allowable areal density, and then it was divided by the mass allowed in a can. This was completed for each of the defined isotopes and the minimum number of cans was then chosen for the limit. The results of all of the calculations may be found in Appendix B. Due to their significantly smaller size a separate limit is defined for hot cell I and the SERF storage cell. These results are also given in Table 3 .
Finally, the number of cans that could be stacked was calculated. This is based on the assumption that the cell is collapsed due to an earthquake, and the cans are crushed into a slab type geometry, and therefore must still be subcritical. The collapsed can condition is not a condition at which operations will be taking place, but is the result of a contingency accident. For operations the conservative mass limit based on 45% of the maximum subcritical fissile concentration is used. For the conservative model of the cell collapse, the configuration only needs to be safely subcritical. Assuming the maximum subcritical areal density, the maximum allowed can mass, and the approximate can outside diameter of 16.5 cm (6.5 in.), the average maximum subcritical can stack height for a uniform array is calculated. This gives heights of 5.5,5.5, and 5.2 cans for 239Pu, 235U, and 233U respectively. Therefore, a stack of five (5) cans is an acceptable value without compromising criticality safety during operations. Considering the limited number of cans allowed in a cell, the average stack height in a cell would be about 2.5 cans for all of the above isotopes. Therefore, as the can stack height is increased in one area, it must decrease in another area. In the event of an earthquake, any taller stacks would tend to fall onto the lower areas, and the system would be more subcritical.
Open cans should be treated as scrap, and the inventories included with the scrap material inventory. This is due to the fact that the contents could spill into an uncontrolled geometry. These cans should not be included as a part of the can limit.
DESIGN FEATURES AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED LIMITS AND REQUIREMENTS
The administratively controlled limits applicable to this evaluation are the maximum mass per one-gallon can, and the maximum number of cans allowed in a cell and the can stack height.
No other fissionable material shall be interspersed within the foot print of the can array, or stacked on or below the cans.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis shows that storage of one-gallon cans that may contain fissile materials in the hot calls of the 327 building can be done safely. Limits for the mass of fissionable materials allowed in each can, and the total number of cans allowed in each hot cell are given in Table 3 of Section 6. Utilizing the current methods of calculating fractional material limits, materials with different limits may be safely stored in each of the hot cells. 
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